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The German energy transition, with its massive subsidization of variable renewable electricity 
generation (wind, solar, etc.) leading to its dramatic expansion, has spurred controversy 
proportional to its ambitions. This chapter focuses on just one critique addressed against it: 
that it is actually bad for the climate. This critique was levelled prominently by Professor 
Joachim Weimann of the Otto-von-Guericke University in Magdeburg and Professor Robert 
Stavins of Harvard University's Kennedy School.1 They argue that promoting solar and wind 
electricity does not reduce any CO2 emissions because coal-fired plants forced to reduce their 
production would merely sell unused emissions allowances to some other emitter. The total 
level of emissions is always equal to the cap, whatever measure is taken to reduce abatement 
costs. Moreover, by depressing the price of emissions allowances, subsidizing renewables 
actually forces other, cheaper, mitigation technologies out of the market, which reduces 
important future mitigation options. It even helps the dirtiest generation technology, old lignite 
power plants. In the end, Weimann blames the German promotion of renewables for being the 
main if not only cause for the difficulties of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). 
A part of the argument may seem paradoxical: if promoting renewables frees emissions 
allowances by taking electricity demand away from coal-fired plants, how could that lead coal-
fired plants to produce more electricity? That is not possible as such, of course, but promoting 
renewable could still help coal-fired plants. Imagine a merit order curve that starts with coal-
fired plants with gradually rising marginal generation costs, including the carbon price, until it 
reaches the level where gas-fired plants become the cheaper option. Promoting renewables 
with guaranteed market uptake leads to a leftward shift of the electricity demand for coal- and 
gas-fired plants. Gas-fired plants are forced first to reduce their production, which frees 
emissions allowances (and is bad for system stability as gas-fired power plants can ramp up 
production the fastest). Their price goes down, which helps coal-fired plants take away some 
production from the remaining gas-fired plants. In fact, the share of natural gas in the German 
electricity mix was about the same in 2014 as in the early 2000, while the share of renewables 
grew from 6.6% to 25.8%.2 The increase in renewable energy production (+120 TWh) really 
accounted for the increased total generation (+34 TWh) and it replaced nuclear generation (–
73 TWh). Total coal-based generation actually declined by 26 TWh. When renewables replace 
nuclear power, which is of course one of the purposes of their promotion in the context of a 
phasing out of nuclear power, they have no impact whatsoever on the carbon price. 
                                               
1 Joachim Weimann, 'Der CO2-Emissionshandel im Zeitalter der Energiewende (2013) 138 Orientierung 
zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik 39-45; Robert N. Stavins, 'The problem with EU 
renewables (2014) 31 The Environmental Forum 14. 
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  2 
Weimann and Stavins' argument that promoting a particular abatement technology under an 
emissions cap is both inefficient and ineffective is quite convincing in a perfect world, a world 
where the central planner efficiently sets an overall cap for CO2 emissions and gradually lowers 
it as mitigation options are improved. A world where market actors anticipate smoothly rising 
carbon prices and invest in abatement technologies accordingly. A world where mitigation 
options compete on a level playing field. In such a world, one instrument – the EU ETS – is all 
that is needed for one goal – a smooth reduction path for CO2 emissions. In the real world, all 
these assumptions are invalidated. First, there is no central planner setting emission caps 
efficiently but instead there is a political system where short-term industrial and employment 
interests weigh more heavily than the interests of future generations. As a result, the cap is set 
much higher than it would be by a forward-looking altruistic planner.3 The consequence is a 
low carbon price. A business cycle downturn, which reduces the demand for carbon intensive 
goods, further depresses the carbon price when the cap is not adjusted, and of course it cannot 
be tightened when the economy is already struggling. All this leads to low and volatile carbon 
prices, which discourage emitters from investing in the research, development and deployment 
of long-lived abatement options. There is too little investment in these options compared to the 
perfect world, which justifies compensatory support by the public sector.  
The support for renewables is even more warranted when carbon intensive alternatives benefit 
from subsidies for other reasons (regional support for coal extraction and transportation for 
instance). And it is more warranted when the technologies face a steep learning curve with 
spill over effects. The German promotion of variable renewables lowered the cost of these 
technologies and led to the spread of their diffusion also outside of the area under the 
European emissions cap. This is possibly the most significant contribution of Germany to 
slowing down climate change. Finally, the political system that will set the next caps is likely to 
follow a more ambitious emissions reduction path now that more abatement options are 
available at lower costs. 
In short, promoting renewables was not necessarily inefficient in the real world and it was 
certainly not ineffective at a global level. There remains Weimann and Stavins' argument that 
it was ineffective at the level of the area under the European emissions cap, at least as long 
as it does not lead to a change in the cap. In a perfect world, emissions will always reach the 
cap. In the real world of the EU ETS, the over-allocation of emissions allowances was so 
massive in the first two phases that the cap could not be reached. When the cap is not reached, 
any instrument that encourages abatement leads actually to a reduction in emissions. Now 
one could argue that the promotion of renewables in Germany led to such a decrease in the 
demand for certificates that it is really responsible for the over-allocation. At least it would have 
had an effect on CO2 emissions. Anyway, that would be giving too much credit to the expansion 
of renewables in Germany and Weimann does not make that argument. Still, it is true that 
promoting renewables contributes to the glut of emissions allowances. 
                                               
3 See also R. Pearse and S. Böhm, 'Ten reasons why carbon markets will not bring about radical 
emissions reduction' (2015) Carbon Management 1-13. 
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This shows that the promotion of renewable power is most effective when it is accompanied 
by the withdrawal of allowances. Of course, it is difficult to determine how many. To the extent 
that renewables replace nuclear power, no allowances are freed. When they replace thermal 
power plants, the quantity of CO2 emissions economized depends on the technology replaced. 
It need not be the most carbon-intensive technology, as shown earlier. Funding the withdrawal 
of allowances is a lesser issue when they are so abundant that they trade almost for free. 
In conclusion, the promotion of electricity generation from renewables cannot be thrown off 
simply because it would be inefficient and ineffective in an ideal world with simple goals and 
perfect markets. There are many goods arguments in favour of such a policy in the real world. 
Nevertheless, it should be designed carefully and it can be made more effective if the 
emissions allowances it liberates are taken out of the market. 
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